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Abstract
Nowhere in Europe is extramarital childbearing more pervasive than in Iceland. 
Roughly, 70% of children born in 2018 were conceived outside of marriage, thereof 
83% of firstborn, which, on the surface, puts Iceland at the vanguard of a develop-
ment often associated with a second demographic transition. In this study, we inves-
tigate the union formation behaviour of Icelandic women during a period of 20 years 
(1994–2013) with the objectives of gaining insight into the interplay of childbear-
ing, registered cohabitation, and marriage and to enhance our understanding of the 
function of registered cohabitation in the family-building process. We use adminis-
trative population register data, covering the childbearing and marital history of the 
total female population born in Iceland during 1962–1997. The data are analysed 
by means of event history techniques and presented as annual indices of first-regis-
tered cohabitation and first-marriage formation, respectively. We find indications of 
forceful postponement of registering cohabitation over time, but a stable portion of 
around 80% of women registered cohabitation before any first marriage or age 46. 
Around 70% of women married before age 46, and the standardized marriage rates 
remained relatively stable during most of our study period. Our findings suggest that 
within a context such as the Icelandic one, most people tend to marry, regardless of 
the prevalence of cohabitation. We propose that registered cohabitation should be 
seen as providing a semi-regulated union status for prospective parents in relation 
to childbearing. Marriage on the other hand could be seen as providing an elevated 
union status to couples.
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We have witnessed fundamental changes in family formation patterns in high-
income countries during the past 50–60  years. These changes—often associated 
with a second demographic transition (SDT)—include lower marriage rates; increas-
ing number of premarital births; and a higher prevalence of nonmarital cohabitation 
(Lesthaeghe 2010). Childbearing and marriage are becoming increasingly uncou-
pled. Iceland is among the vanguards in this development and, together with Chile 
and Costa Rica, the share of nonmarital births is larger than anywhere else among 
the countries covered by the OECD (OECD 2019a). According to recent data, seven 
out of ten Icelandic children are born to unwed mothers: 83% of firstborn; 67% of 
second-born; and 53% of third-born (Statistics Iceland 2019). The relatively high 
portion of premarital and nonmarital births has received international attention and 
raised questions about the future of marriage in Iceland (Weir 2017). It even earned 
the country the title of a Nation of Bastards in a religious American documentary 
(Faithful Word Baptist Church 2017; see also Farrow 2007). However, a quick 
glance over official statistics shows that the crude marriage rate of Iceland is on par 
with the OECD countries’ average (Fig. 1), which on the surface may appear coun-
ter-intuitive given the frontrunner status of the country in terms of the frequency of 
out-of-wedlock births.
This study context provides a strong case to investigate family formation from the 
perspective of the second demographic transition framework, discussed below, with 
respect to the country’s long history of cohabitation and its frontrunner status in 


























































Fig. 1  Number of marriages per 1000 of population 1994–2011. Source: OECD (2019b) (and author’s 
calculations). Note: Official figures pertaining to 2012 onwards for Iceland are not available
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insight into future trends elsewhere. Despite the advanced development in the coun-
try, the (recent) family formation patterns have not been studied before. The objec-
tive of this study is to provide the first comprehensive overview of recent trends in 
union formation in Iceland. To that end, we display a system of annual indices of the 
propensity to register cohabitation and marry during a 20-year period: between 1994 
and 2013. We rely on a proven method, established by Hoem (1991, 1993) and later 
elaborated by Andersson (1997, 1998, 1999), where we standardize union forma-
tion risks of age and other relevant demographic factors. We use population-based 
register data in our calculations, covering the total female population born in Iceland 
between 1962 and 1997. The data contain the childbearing and union histories of 
these women, including information about registered cohabitation. As our data stem 
from administrative population registers, we are restricted to couples that register 
their cohabitation. Registered cohabitation is a semi-formalized type of union that is 
associated with certain rights and obligations (discussed below). According to sur-
vey estimates, about three-in-four couples sharing a residence have registered their 
cohabitation (Jónsson 2019). Couples that do not register their union for one reason 
or another are not counted as cohabiters as we do not have any information on their 
actual family status. Nonetheless, with these reservations in mind, data on registered 
cohabitation give us a rare opportunity to study on a population level the prevalence 
of registered cohabitation over time to gain insight into the interplay of childbear-
ing, registered cohabitation, and marriage and to enhance our understanding of the 
nature and function of registered cohabitation in the family-building process.
In what follows, we first provide a background of the general trends and potential 
determinants of changes in family formation in western countries. Subsequently, we 
turn our attention to the Icelandic context. After a discussion about the study back-
ground, we describe the data and methods and present the results. Finally, we con-
clude with a summary discussion.
2  Background
Across Europe, marriage rates have declined substantially since the 1960s; fertility 
has decreased, in some places to very low levels; the number of unmarried cou-
ples has increased; and more children are born to unwed mothers (Sobotka and Tou-
lemon 2008; Billari and Liefbroer 2010). An overview of EU28 statistics demon-
strates that the Crude Marriage Rate decreased from 7.8 in 1965 to 4.1 in 2013, the 
Crude Divorce Rate increased from 0.8 to 1.9 during the same period, while the 
Crude Birth Rate of the EU28 countries dropped from 17.9 to 10.0 (Eurostat 2020). 
In terms of proportions of live births outside of marriage, the figure increased from 
around 20% in 1993 to 41% in 2013 (Eurostat 2020). Simultaneously, we observe 
increases in the median ages of the usual family-related indicators of the transition to 
adulthood: first-union formation, marriage, parenthood and to a lesser extent home 
leaving (Andersson and Philipov 2002; Andersson et al. 2017). On the surface, in 
most European countries this transformation appears in the form of a universal shift 
towards “less family” and more diverse living arrangements, fewer children—and a 
68 A. K. Jónsson 
1 3
gradual retreat of marriage as the primary social institution for the family (Sobotka 
and Toulemon 2008; Esping-Andersen 2016).
One of the most prevalent theoretical frameworks in the demographic literature 
explaining this scenario is the second demographic transition thesis (SDT). Accord-
ing to the SDT—which has been used as somewhat of “a label, description, and 
even explanation for a plethora of diverse changes in fertility and family-related 
behaviours and attitudes” (Sobotka 2008, p. 172)—the family-related changes 
described above are, to describe it rather vaguely, a consequence of postmodern val-
ues. According to its proponents, the SDT is founded on an upsurge of higher-order 
needs, such as self-fulfilment, lifestyle, and personal development (van de Kaa 1996, 
425). Childbearing becomes a choice rather than inevitability, competing with other 
“goods” in life, and is easily controlled by means of modern contraception. Simul-
taneously, we observe an increase in the frequency of extramarital births. While the 
two may appear contradictive, i.e. increased control over ones procreation and an 
expansion in the share of births out of wedlock, this contradiction is explained as a 
consequence of marriage ceasing to be the normative setting for childbearing (van 
de Kaa 1996). The strong normative structure, previously supported by both church 
and state, loses ground in an era governed by individual choice and freedom of self 
(Lesthaeghe 2010). Consequently, individuals make family-related choices based on 
their personal self-fulfilment (Carlson 2019). Cohabitation emerges as an alterna-
tive to marriage and can be viewed as one of the crucial components behind the de-
standardization of traditional family formation patterns (Noack et al. 2013), and “the 
important engine driving the rise in nonmarital childbearing in Europe” (Kiernan 
2004, 43).
Albeit the expansion of these SDT-related symptoms appears universal in Europe 
(Lesthaeghe 2010), highlighted by the increase in childbearing within cohabitat-
ing unions (Kiernan 2004; Perelli-Harris et  al. 2009), there (still) is a shortage of 
evidence that indicates any convergence to a new general pattern of family demo-
graphic behaviour across developed countries (Sobotka and Toulemon 2008; Bil-
lari and Liefbroer 2010; Perelli-Harris and Sánchez Gassen 2012). While consistent 
country variations have been assigned to differentials in societal contexts (Lesthae-
ghe 2010; Carlson 2019; Heuvelline and Timberlake 2004; Thomson 2005; Bil-
lari and Liefbroer 2010; Perelli-Harris and Lyons-Amos 2015), they have equally 
brought about criticism of the SDT framework. Recent trends in family demogra-
phy in the SDT-frontrunner states, the Nordic countries, demonstrate a turnaround 
towards increasing marriage rates since the late 1990s (Ohlsson-Wijk 2011) and a 
relatively high fertility in the region, in parallel to some of the highest nonmarital 
birth rates in Europe (Sobotka and Toulemon 2008), and persisting prevalence of 
nonmarital cohabitation (Andersson and Philipov 2002; Andersson et al. 2017). This 
development has nourished criticism of the SDT thesis to the extent that the cred-
ibility of the individualization perspective has been questioned and contributed to a 
hypothesis about a return to “more family” in the region (Esping-Andersen 2016, 9).
The relatively high gender egalitarianism in the Nordic countries has fuelled the-
ories that instead make gender relations the explanatory point of departure of recent 
family changes (McDonald 2000a; Esping-Andersen and Billari 2015; Goldscheider 
et al. 2015). According to proponents of the gender relations framework, the impetus 
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behind the ongoing development is thoroughly structural and to a much less extent 
based on ideation (Goldscheider et al. 2015). The phase of less family is considered 
as a consequence of imbalances between the expected societal roles of women on 
the one hand and their opportunities on the other (McDonald 2000a, b, 2013). Previ-
ous structural constraints stemming from the “traditional gender system” prevented 
women from being full participants in the labour market, as manifested by the bread-
winner husband and stay-at-home wife (Goldscheider et al. 2015). Later, following 
improvements in women’s position outside the family and their expanded economic 
responsibilities, other kinds of structural constraints emerged—related to prolonged 
education and career building and manifested in postponed and even hindered child-
bearing and family formation (Goldscheider et al. 2015). During this period of “nor-
mative flux”, when women’s roles are advanced but society has yet to adapt in terms 
of new family norms and implementations of gender egalitarian family policies, it 
is argued that fertility tends to be low and union instability high (Esping-Andersen 
and Billari 2015). During the second phase of a “gender revolution”, gender equal-
ity will have increased and men will enter the private sphere with a feminization of 
men’s roles, relieving women of much of their caring responsibilities (Goldscheider 
et  al. 2015). Consequently, the gender perspective expects greater ultimate family 
stability, including increased prevalence of marriage, and higher fertility (Goldsc-
heider et al. 2015; Frejka et al. 2018).
Although the two theoretical frameworks originate from two distinct standpoints 
both sets of theories aim to explain the same overall developments, i.e. an initial 
trend towards less family highlighted by declining marriage intensities, increases in 
nonmarital childbearing, diffusion of cohabitation, and low(er) fertility. The gender 
perspective regards this development as an interim part during (the first phase of) a 
gender revolution while the SDT thesis approaches it as part of a transition, with a 
somewhat ambiguous endpoint. In terms of the Iceland’s stable childbearing trends 
and continuously high fertility, the development in this country appears to deviate 
somewhat from the expected pattern (cf. Jónsson 2017).
To a large extent, Iceland resembles the other Nordic countries—Denmark, Fin-
land, Norway, and Sweden—in terms of its culture and institutional settings, and it 
shares the record high prevalence of cohabitation with the other Nordic countries 
(Kalmijn 2007; Andersson and Philipov 2002)—elaborated on below. The Icelandic 
culture is highly individualized when measured according to various cultural dimen-
sion indexes (Aðalsteinsson et al. 2011), and the country is also relatively secular: 
according to a survey, less than four in five Icelanders under the age of 25 said that 
they were religious, and none of the respondents in that age category believed that 
God created the Earth (Siðmennt 2016).
In relative terms, Iceland is highly gender egalitarian (World Economic Forum 
2018), but there still is an imbalance in the levels of gender equity between 
“individual-oriented” and “family-oriented” institutions (cf. McDonald 2000b). 
Although Icelandic men occupy a world record share of father’s parental leave 
use, around one-third of the total leave days, women still exploit larger fraction 
of days (for a detailed discussion, see Jónsson 2018). According to survey esti-
mates, Icelandic men spend about the same amount of time in household chores 
as men in the other Nordic countries, but which only amounts to about 70% of the 
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time women spend on similar tasks (excluding childcare) (ISSP Research Group 
2016, author’s calculations). Ever since the 1960s, female labour force partici-
pation in Iceland has been one of the highest in the world—despite that family 
policies were developed relatively late in Iceland compared to the other Nordic 
countries (Eydal 2008). Today, it is almost on par with that of men’s: about 80% 
of all women of childbearing ages are active in the labour market, but women 
are more likely than men to work part-time (Statistics Iceland 2019). During our 
study period (1994–2013), the number of women in tertiary education increased 
by about 150%, and women make currently roughly 60% of all university students 
(Statistics Iceland 2019). Notwithstanding, fertility has hardly declined to sub-
replacement levels. The total fertility rate (TFR) has remained above the aver-
age in Europe, and it fluctuated around 2.1 ever since the mid-1970s and until 
the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis. The projected completed fertility of 
the 1984 birth cohort is estimated at 2.3 children per woman (Statistics Iceland 
2019). Iceland has thus never experienced the same drop in fertility as most other 
developed countries and as both sets of theories discussed above expect.
Our research questions are as follows: first, we set out to study if there have 
been any changes in the union formation behaviour in Iceland during the last few 
decades. If this is the case, we study the extent to which registered cohabitation 
has been replacing marriage. Based on the SDT narrative, one might expect an 
increase in the propensity to register cohabitation at the expense of the propensi-
ties to marry, whereas with regard to gender equality theory, we could expect to 
find an ultimate increase in marriage rates as Iceland has progressed further in 
terms of the second half of a gender revolution than most other developed coun-
tries. If registered cohabitation is viewed as an alternative to marriage, we might 
expect recent decreases in registered cohabitation due to increased commitment 
among couples which would be reflected in increasing marriage rates as the sec-
ond half of the gender revolution progresses. However, if registered cohabitation 
is rather employed as an intermediate step in relation to childbearing and mar-
riage, we can expect a more stable proportion of people registering cohabitation 
over time. Second, we ask whether there are indications of any specific period 
influences in family formation during our study period. Here, we are particu-
larly interested in the last years of our study period. In 2008, Iceland suffered an 
economic breakdown when the country’s financial system collapsed. Unemploy-
ment increased sevenfold (Directorate of Labour 2015); the value of the Icelandic 
Krona dropped by some 50% (Einarsson et al. 2015); and social turmoil followed. 
In other contexts, poor labour market conditions have been negatively associated 
with union formation, both in the long-term with regard to marriage (Schaller 
2013) and in terms of postponed and worse quality matching in couple formation 
in general (Ekert-Jaffe and Solaz 2001). Presumably, unemployment and low job 
security will reduce people’s confidence in the future, which might have dete-
riorating effects on couples’ commitment and their investment in family build-
ing (Ekert-Jaffe and Solaz 2001). Jónsson (2018) found that in the aftermath of 
the economic crisis fertility in Iceland declined, regardless of parity. If the crisis 
had any influence on union formation, we expect to find a drop in first-marriage 
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intensities and the propensity to register cohabitation around the time when the 
crisis materialized, in tandem with the declining fertility.
3  Cohabitation and Nonmarital Childbearing in Iceland
Iceland has a long tradition of nonmarital childbearing and cohabitation, which pre-
sumably dates back to the island’s settlement in the 800s and the “Old Norse cul-
ture” with its alleged high degree of gender equality and liberal attitudes towards 
premarital sex relations (Tomasson 1976, 256)—and thus long before even any first 
demographic transition took place. As far back as publication of official statistics go 
(mid-1800s in Iceland) the proportion of premarital births has been exceptionally 
high—even compared to “other liberal Scandinavian countries” (Björnsson 1969, 
1). In the 1940s, one-in-four children was born to unwed mothers, as compared to 
a little more than the one-in-five children born out of wedlock in the 1870s (Trost 
1978, 304). From the mid-1990s onwards over 60% of children in Iceland have been 
born outside of marriage (Statistics Iceland 2019).
Without going into detail about historical trends, the high rate of illegitimacy in 
Iceland in the nineteenth and early to mid-twentieth century is suggested to be a 
consequence of cohabitation without or prior to marriage—which again has been 
associated with the long-lasting effects of “festar” (Björnsson 1969), i.e. the medi-
aeval version of common law marriage, and the historical inefficacy of the Chris-
tian Church to preach the moral superiority of marriage in the country. In previ-
ous centuries, even the leading church men and bishops in Iceland had illigimate 
children without them having any social stigma attached to it (Gjerset 1925 as cited 
in Tomasson 1976, 258). Unmarried cohabitation and childbearing within this 
marriage-like union have thus, presumably, never been considered a deviant behav-
iour in Iceland (Björnsson 1969; Trost 1978). Nevertheless, even though nonmari-
tal cohabitation has historical strong grounds in Iceland and is integrated into the 
culture of the country, with high tolerance towards nonmarital births attached to it, 
marriage was, at least during most of the twentieth century, still the final destination 
for the majority of the population. Cohabitation was mainly exercised as a prelude to 
marriage, during which time couples were establishing themselves economically—a 
behaviour that was not limited to the lower stratum of society (Björnsson 1969).
Apart from historical and cultural factors, the current frontrunner status of Ice-
land in terms of the prevalence of cohabitation and the high portion of premarital 
births can surely be traced to a progressive legislation concerning nonmarital cohab-
itation as an accepted family form during the past six to seven decades. To a large 
extent, regulations regarding nonmarital cohabitation in Iceland are similar to what 
they are in the other Nordic countries. In some matters, marriage and (registered) 
cohabitation are indistinguishable, but in others a clear legislative distinction is still 
made between the two unions (see below). The rationale for maintaining this distinc-
tion is twofold: first, to encourage couples to marry as it is considered the desirable 
modus vivendi by the legislative power; and second, to offer couples an alternative 
way to formalize their union (Alþingistíðindi 2000–2001). In general, those who are 
qualified to marry are also qualified to register cohabitation, e.g. in terms of age 
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and interrelations. Registered cohabitation can be viewed as a light and less formal-
ized version of the French PACS but contrary to PACS, Icelandic laws pertaining to 
registered cohabitation were until recently only intended for heterosexual couples 
(for a comparison see Waaldijk et al. 2017). In 2006, same-sex couples were also 
allowed to register their cohabitation (Alþingi 2006), and in 2010 the marriage act 
was reformed as well as to include same-sex couples (Alþingi 2010). Below we dis-
cuss the main similarities and differences between marriage and registered cohab-
itation in Iceland. For a comprehensive overview see Friðriksdóttir (2010, 2011); 
Alþingistíðindi 2000–2001; and Waaldijk et al. (2017).
3.1  Regulations Concerning Registered Nonmarital Cohabitation in Iceland
Currently, there is no single legislation on registered cohabitation in Iceland (i.e. 
comparable to that of the marriage act (Alþingi 1993). Nevertheless, since the mid-
twentieth century, various steps have been taken to enhance the rights of cohabiting 
couples—making this type of union more marriage-like. Already in 1943 nonmari-
tal cohabitation is mentioned in Icelandic legislation as a part of the Act on Social 
Security, stipulating that cohabiting and married couples share the same obliga-
tions and rights in terms of national insurance. Since then legal provisions regarding 
nonmarital cohabitation have been implemented into various acts—usually next to 
clauses on marriage. Normally, stipulations regarding nonmarital cohabitation have 
a requirement about the union being registered; they depend on the length of the 
co-residence (usually one or two years), or they are conditional on couples having a 
child together (Alþingistíðindi 2000–2001).
In terms of social and family affairs, regulations pertaining to marriage usually 
apply to registered cohabiting couples as well. Child benefits and other family-
related benefits are calculated the same way and are usually based on household 
income (Fjármálaráðuneytið 2004). Paternity is automatically recorded if couples 
have registered their cohabitation; biological cohabiting parents have the same rights 
in regard to parental leave as married couples, and upon union dissolution the gen-
eral rule applies to registered cohabiting parents as to married parents: joint custody 
(Alþingi 2003a). Other couples need to go through more laborious administrative 
processes, even if they share a residence.
In terms of taxation, registered cohabitants can decide whether they are taxed as 
individuals or as married couples with a joint taxation and thus, depending on the 
partner’s income, being entitled to a tax discount. Married couples do not have this 
option and the spouses have the joint responsibility for each other’s taxes (Alþingi 
2003b; Waaldijk et  al. 2017). To a large extent, the same regulations still apply 
regardless whether couples have registered their cohabitation or married in regard 
to the Social Security Act (Alþingi 2007), i.e. in terms of social security benefits, 
family and maintenance benefits, and pension. Lone parents on the other hand are, 
in general, entitled to significantly more financial support than married couples and 
couples in registered cohabitation. In many cases they are also prioratized when it 
comes to childcare placements and entitled to reduced day care fees (Alþingistíðindi 
2000–2001; Kristjánsson 2011). This modus operandi might sometimes act as an 
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incentitive for couples not to register their cohabitation. However, couples shar-
ing a residence are expected to register their cohabitation around the time of any 
childbirth, i.e. if they have not done so previously, and they are subjects to sanctions 
if they claim benefits for lone parents while sharing a residence at the same time 
(Alþingi 2003b).
With some simplification, the main differences between marriage and registered 
cohabitation in Iceland relate to statues regarding personal finances, in particular in 
relation to union dissolution and inheritance. There are no specific laws that pertain 
to financial matters of registered cohabiters or regulations that stipulate how couples 
shall split property upon union dissolution as there are for married couples. Accord-
ing to principle, each cohabitant is responsible for his or her properties and liabili-
ties, and it is the individual who is the sole owner of what (s)he acquires during the 
course of the union.1 Married people are jointly liable in terms of tax and household 
debts, but there are no other financial liabilities unless there is a written agreement. 
Upon divorce, the principle of equal division of assets applies to married couples 
(Alþingistíðindi 2000–2001). There is no maintenance obligation between registered 
cohabiters during the course of the union as in marriage. However, both parents 
have maintenance obligation towards their children. There are also no general stipu-
lations that encourage egalitarianism within a registered cohabiting union as there 
are for married couples in the marriage act (Alþingi 1993). Registered cohabitants 
can make a contract about joint financial affairs, which may include clauses about 
how to divide any property or debts upon separation (similar to a prenuptial agree-
ment), but the validity of such contracts can be contested in court (Friðriksdóttir 
2011). Alimony payments of any kind after union dissolution are not common prac-
tise in Iceland. Finally, contrary to married people, a registered cohabiting partner 
is not considered a legal heir, and the surviving partner does not have the right to 
retain an undivided estate. Unless there is a written testament, all properties go to 
whomever is considered next of kin according to law (Alþingistíðindi 2000–2001; 
Friðriksdóttir 2011).
4  Data and Method
4.1  Data
In our analysis, we rely on official population-based register data made available 
to us by Statistics Iceland. Everyone in Iceland is assigned a specific identifica-
tion number used for, among other things, administrative purposes. By using an 
encrypted version of this identification number, we are able to merge individual-
level information from different administrative population registers, which enables 
1 There are legal precedents where the courts have ruled that a registered cohabitant is entitled to a share 
of assets that have been accuired by the partner during the course of the union, albeit with consideration 




us to create full family-life histories of our subjects. This longitudinal data source 
gives us access to childbearing histories of the 1962–1997 birth cohorts of Icelan-
dic-born women; their formal union histories (registered cohabitation and mar-
riage); and the information we need for censoring purposes (migration history, age, 
and time of death).
Apart from a change that came into effect in 2006 and allowed same-sex couples 
to register their cohabitation (Alþingi 2006), and a reform in 2010 that extended 
the marriage act to include same-sex couples (Alþingi 2010), we are not aware of 
any significant changes that were made to the process of registration during the 
study period and which could have implications in the analysis. Registered same-sex 
cohabitation and marriages are included in our analyses from the date of change, 
which comprise around 1% of all registrations/marriages after the respective amend-
ments came into effect (Statistics Iceland 2019).
The data source ensures that the data are accurate; we do not have to rely on 
the memory of our subjects; sampling errors are of no concern; and the population-
based approach facilitates all statistical inference. A potential disadvantage of our 
data is that they are limited to demographic events (i.e. we do not have access to 
socio-economic variables that could be of interest), and we do not have informa-
tion on men. Hence, we cannot detect if there are any differences in terms of, e.g. 
socio-economic status between those who register their cohabitation, those who do 
not register their union but share a residence, and those who marry. Also, we should 
keep in mind that the register data only contain official information. Informal cohab-
itation and other alternative living arrangements are not registered or covered in our 
dataset. We do not know when the actual cohabitation in terms of sharing a resi-
dence as a couple began, only when it was officially registered.
When constructing the union histories, we combined data from two registers: 
Registry of Change (Breytingarskrá) and the National Registry (Þjóðskrá). The 
first is our main data source as it includes information about the year and month of 
change in marital or registered cohabitation status, while the latter consists of yearly 
data only. We rely on the latter and assign June as the month of event occurrence if 
information is missing from the Registry of Change (less than 1% of all observa-
tions). We follow women from the age of 15 onward, until the exact age of 45 and 
11 months, or 31 December 2013, whichever comes first. Our study population con-
sists of 71,006 women who were born in Iceland during 1962–1997.
4.2  Method
Our system of annual indices of first-(registered)-cohabitation risks and first-mar-
riage risks, respectively, is based on an improved version of indirect standardiza-
tion (for details, see Hoem 1991, 1993). We produce these indices by estimating 
piecewise constant exponential regression models—the risks of entering registered 
cohabitation and the risks of getting married—relative to the risks in the baseline 
year 2003, after we have standardized for various demographic factors: age, par-
ity, and registered cohabitation status. (The last applies to first-marriage risks only.) 
This method enables us to investigate the underlying behaviour as it allows us to 
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account for compositional changes in the study population over time that may influ-
ence union formation (Andersson 1998). For the analysis, we used the STATA soft-
ware, version 15.1, and its built-in st-commands, which declare the data to be sur-
vival time data. See StataCorp. (2013) for detailed information and a list of relevant 
commands. For a comprehensive overview of event history analysis, see, e.g. Alli-
son (1984), Blossfeld et al. (2007).
In all our main effects models, woman’s age is the main duration variable, catego-
rized into single-year groups of ages 15–45, and parity is included as a time-varying 
covariate. In the marriage model, registered cohabitation status is included as a time-
varying dummy, measuring whether women are living in registered cohabitation or 
not in any given month. All the variables are measured with a monthly accuracy. If 
registered cohabitation status and/or parity changes in the same month as any event 
of interest takes place, the new value is considered in the regression models. While 
our choice of baseline year is 2003, it is completely arbitrary as the general trends 
come out the same, regardless of base year. Our interpretations of the indices are 
comparable to those of a price index, demonstrating trends in prices relative to a 
given year (Andersson 1998)—hence, 2003 in our case. Women are right-censored 
at the time of any emigration after the age of 15, in the month of their 46th birthday 
or death, and in our registered cohabitation analysis at first marriage—whichever 
comes first.
As the estimated risks depend on both the exposure time and the number of reg-
istered events, any variation in our annual indices can reflect changes in either the 
timing of union formation, or the portion of women who enters a union (marriage 
or registered cohabitation) before age 46. To better distinguish between the two, 
we additionally present Kaplan–Meier descriptive synthetic cohort measures of the 
cumulative progressions to first-registered cohabitation and first marriage by age 
and calendar-year groups. In all the analyses, we study the two processes (first-regis-
tered cohabitation and first-marriage formation) independently of one another, with 
the exception that women are censored at first-marriage formation when estimating 
the risks of first-registered cohabitation (in cases where marriage precedes any first-
registered cohabitation). The “exposure clock” is set to zero at age 15 and women 
enter the analyses in 1994 or the month they turn 15, whichever comes last. Hence, 
birth cohorts of women born before 1968 contribute full histories (until age 45 and 
11 months), while the 1997 birth cohort only contributes to the last two calendar 
years of observation in 2012–2013. In all analyses, if women experience the event 
of interest prior to 1994 they are left-truncated. In what follows, the relative risks 
are interchangeably referred to as intensities, standardized rates, or propensities to 
register cohabitation or marry. Background statistics on the distribution of entries 
into union and exposure times under risk by variables and union type are available 




5.1  First‑Registered Cohabitation, First‑Marriage Formation, and First Childbirth 
During 1994–2013
Figure 2 presents Kaplan–Meier estimates of the cumulative probabilities of a syn-
thetic cohort of Icelandic women to experience childbirth; registered cohabitation; 
and marriage during 1994–2013. The estimates indicate that around 90% of women 
become mothers before age 46. Jónsson (2017) has shown that there is no evidence 
of increased childlessness in Iceland during the past three to four decades (see also 
Appendix Fig. 5). With a potential risk of “aggregation fallacy”, i.e. the tendency to 
falsely infer standard sequences in real-life courses from median ages (Billari 2001, 
124), Fig. 2 suggests that first childbearing and first formal cohabitation are closely 
associated: at age 28, 60% of women have given birth and the same portion has reg-
istered cohabitation, and the progressions to these two events, first-registered cohab-
itation and first birth, go hand in hand.
The cumulative probabilities indicate that three in every four women enter reg-
istered cohabitation as their first formal union, compared to one-in-ten women who 
marry without having registered any cohabitation first (see Appendix Fig.  6), but 
also, that the majority of first-registered cohabiting unions are later transformed into 
marriages. At age 30, one-in-three women have married according to our estimates, 
while more than twice as many have become a mother during our study period. At 
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Fig. 2  Kaplan–Meier cumulative probabilities of first childbirth, first-registered cohabitation, and first-
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and ten years later to almost 70% (Fig. 2). This indicates that while the association 
between first-marriage formation and first childbearing appears weak (demonstrated 
in more detail below), marriage is indeed part of the more advanced stages of the 
life course for the majority of women. Any claims about marriage being a critically 
endangered social institution in Iceland should therefore be treated with caution.
5.2  Timing and Quantum in the Formation of First‑Registered Cohabiting Union 
and First Marriage in Iceland, 1994–2013
Figure  3a presents Kaplan–Meier synthetic cohort estimates of the cumulative 
probability of Icelandic women that enter first-registered cohabitation before turn-
ing 46 or marrying directly by calendar-year period (1994–1999, 2000–2007, and 
2008–2013).2 The estimates indicate a rather forceful postponement of first-regis-
tered cohabitation formation over time, but only minor changes in terms of the frac-
tions that eventually register cohabitation.3 On average during 1994–2013, around 
80% of women who do not marry directly register cohabitation before age 46, and 
this portion remained relatively stable during our study period. Over the 20 years, 
the age at which 50% of women had registered cohabitation, had, however, increased 
by almost four years: the age when half of the women had formally cohabited shifted 
from being around 24 years in 1994–1999 to 28 during 2008–2013. The observed 
postponement results in an overall decline in the propensity to register cohabitation 
over time—as shown by the relative risks presented in Fig. 4 below.
On the aggregate level, the observed increase in the age at which women register 
their first cohabitation appears to have had only marginal effects on the median age 
at first-marriage formation during the first two sub-periods we study, ranging from 
1994 to 2007. Contrary to what we observed in Fig. 3a, the Kaplan–Meier synthetic 
cohort estimates of women entering marriage in Fig. 3b indicate that postponement 
of marriage was only minor during those initial years and that the age at which 50% 
of women had married was roughly the same (34  years) during 1994–1999 and 
2000–2007, respectively. Also, the shape of the two curves does not demonstrate 
any retreat from marriage during 1994–2007 (with the reservation that ages 39–46 
are missing from our first period).
A more palpable change occurs during the economic crisis period, i.e. during 
2008–2013, which we did not detect to the same extent in the first cohabitation–for-
mation patterns. During and in the aftermath of the crisis, we both observe a force-
ful postponement of marriage, and, at age 46, that only 60% of women would even-
tually marry compared to around 70% in the preceding periods (Fig. 3b). In order to 
better depict these changes in nuptiality behaviour over time, we next present stand-
ardized annual first-registered cohabitation and first-marriage formation rates.
2 For similar Kaplan–Meier estimates of cumulative probabilities of childless Icelandic women progress-
ing to parity one by calendar-year period see Appendix Fig. 5.
3 Our data are based on the registration of the event, hence we do not know if the postponement is 

































Fig. 3  a First-registered cohabitation Kaplan–Meier cumulative probability estimates, 1994–2013, by 
age of woman over calendar-year periods in Iceland. Source: Icelandic register data, author’s calcula-
tions. b Kaplan–Meier cumulative probability estimates of first-marriage formation, 1994–2013, by age 
of woman over calendar-year periods in Iceland. Source: Icelandic register data, author’s calculations
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5.3  Period Trends in First‑Registered Cohabitation and First‑Marriage Formation
In Fig. 4, we display the annual indices of the propensity to register entry into first-
registered cohabitation and first marriage, relative to the baseline year 2003. These 
standardized rates provide robust estimates of any behavioural changes over time as 
we control for compositional changes in the study population in terms of age, parity, 
and for marriage intensities, registered cohabitation status. For illustration purposes, 
we also present similar age-standardized rates of first-birth fertility (cf. Jónsson 2017).
As expected from previous accounts of postponed registered cohabitation patterns, 
we find a trend of declining propensity to register first cohabitation between 1994 
and 2006 (Fig. 4), in tandem with declining first-birth intensities. We also observe a 
subsequent period of relatively stable risks of registering first cohabitation at the end 
of our study period. At the beginning of our period, women had roughly 70% higher 
risk of registering cohabitation than they had in 2006 and almost 90% higher risk 
than in 2013. However, as was already established in Fig. 3a, the declining propensity 
to register cohabitation is merely a consequence of postponement of first-registered 
cohabitation over time and does not reflect a retreat from this type of union. Further, 
more detailed estimates indicate a forceful decline in the propensity to register first 
cohabitation among women aged 15–26, but a parallel increase at older ages when 
models are estimated for these age groups, separately (see Appendix Fig. 7).
According to the standardized first-marriage rates in Fig.  4, the propensity to 
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Fig. 4  Relative risks of first-registered cohabitation, first-marriage formation, and first-birth fertility in 
Iceland 1994–2013. Standardized for age of woman (registered cohabitation status and parity). Rates are 




the rates between these calendar years, with the exception of a noticeable increase in 
year 2000, which is similar to millennium peaks observed in other Nordic countries 
(Ohlsson-Wijk 2011). Further analyses reveal minor changes in the age schedule of 
first-marriage formation during 1994–2007 (see Appendix Fig.  8), and little evi-
dence of the gradient by parity changing over time. A small decline over time in the 
propensity to marry during 1994–2007 among childless and one-child mothers can 
be detected, and, similarly, a minor increase in marriage intensities among women at 
the higher parities (see Appendix Fig. 9).
Between 2007 and 2009, we observe a clear decrease in first-marriage rates (Fig. 4). 
The propensity to marry during and in the aftermath of the crisis is only around 70–80% 
of what it was prior to the economic crash. A further inspection of our estimates indi-
cates that the drop between 2007 and 2009 was a result of declining marriage intensi-
ties across all our parameters—age, parity, and registered cohabitation status—and that 
the lower marriage risks were sustained in subsequent years by decreased propensity to 
marry among women under age 33, at parities 0 and 1, and by women who were living 
in registered cohabitation (see Appendix Figs. 8, 9, and 10, respectively). We conclude 
our battery of analyses with a closer look at the role of parity and registered cohabita-
tion status (in marriage risks) in the union formation risks of Icelandic women.
On average during the period, one-child mothers have almost 90% higher intensi-
ties to register cohabitation than childless women (Table 1). This manifests that the 
official registration of the union is often associated with first childbirth. After that, 
the propensities to register cohabitation decrease with each additional child. Fur-
ther analysis reveals a declining propensity over time to register cohabitation among 
childless women and among one-child mothers (see Appendix Fig. 11), which may 
suggest that unions are increasingly being registered post-birth rather than before 
becoming a mother. It is not inconceivable that family policies that enhance the 
rights of single parents, such as an income threshold for child benefits or admission 
qualifications for day care, might act as an incentive for couples to postpone union 
registration until later stages in the process of family building. For discussion of 
related patterns in other European countries, see Noack (2001), Knijn et al. (2007).
In general, and contrary to what we found regarding registered cohabitation, the 
propensity to marry increases with each additional child: on average, two- three-, 
Table 1  Relative risks of 
first-registered cohabitation 
and of first-marriage formation 
in Iceland, 1994–2013, by 
parity and cohabitation status. 
Standardized for age of woman, 
and calendar year. Source: 
Icelandic register data, author’s 
calculations





Haz. ratio P > z Haz. ratio P > z
Parity 0 0.53*** 0.000 0.86*** 0.000
Parity 1 1 … 1 …
Parity 2 0.84*** 0.000 1.30*** 0.000
Parity 3 0.59*** 0.000 1.36*** 0.000
Parity 4 0.28*** 0.000 1.36*** 0.000
Parity 5 0.21** 0.029 1.67*** 0.000
Not in cohabitation 1 …
In cohabitation 5.27*** 0.000
81
1 3
A Nation of Bastards? Registered Cohabitation, Childbearing,…
and four-child mothers have around 30–40% higher risks of getting married com-
pared to one-child mothers, and around 50–60% higher risks than childless women, 
after we have standardized for calendar year, age, and registered cohabitation status 
(Table  1). Further, women who live in registered cohabitation have on average a 
five-fold risk of marrying, compared to women not living in registered cohabitation. 
This underlines that registered cohabitation is the main family-building institution 
in Iceland, while marriage appears as more of a later-in-life venue of family change.
6  Discussion
In terms of the second demographic transition narrative, one might have expected to 
find an increase in registered cohabitation over time, considering that it is a less com-
mitted and easier to dissolve union type than marriage—i.e. assuming that people 
would prefer to sustain more independence and relative freedom after committing to a 
union. However, counter to expectations, we do not observe any increase over time in 
the propensity to register cohabitation. The most palpable change in family formation 
that we observe during the 20-year long study period is that of postponed entry into this 
union type (and thus decreasing risk of first-registered cohabitation formation), which 
goes in parallel with a trend of delayed parenthood (see Jónsson 2017). Presumably, the 
lack of increases in registered cohabitation over time can be traced to the pervasiveness 
of this union type that already existed at the beginning of our study period. According 
to our estimates, about four in five women register cohabitation before turning 46, and 
this portion remained constant throughout the study period (1994–2013).
The prevalence of registered cohabitation is impressive, even compared to levels 
of informal cohabitation elsewhere in Northern Europe. The prevalence resembles 
those of less formal cohabitation in the other Nordic countries, Netherlands, Bel-
gium, and France, where around 90% of women cohabit (informally) if they do not 
marry directly (Andersson et al. 2017, Table A-2b). Nonmarital cohabitation is inte-
grated into Icelandic culture, and this family form is supported by legislation to the 
extent that almost no distinction is made between registered cohabitants and married 
couples in regard to childbearing and childrearing. In terms of Heuveline and Tim-
berlake’s (2004) ideal types of cohabitation with respect to family formation, Iceland 
appears to represent a country such as Sweden where cohabitation is almost indistin-
guishable from marriage. Registered cohabitation enjoys general social acceptance 
and considerable institutional support; it does not seem to be viewed antithetical to 
marriage. Further, the majority of first-registered cohabitation episodes in Iceland 
are followed by the transition to marriage—unlike the French PACS that is rather 
considered an alternative to marriage (Heuveline and Timberlake 2004; Rault 2019).
When it comes to first-marriage formation the most interesting discovery is per-
haps the stability in standardized first-marriage rates over time. We find scarce evi-
dence of behavioural changes in first-marriage formation, and we had to wait for an 
economic collapse before observing any notable decline in standardized first-mar-
riage rates. Also, contrary to what one might expect: the postponement observed 
over time in the formation of first-registered cohabitation did not lead to decreases 
in first-marriage intensities—at least when we focus on the decade-and-a-half long 
82 A. K. Jónsson 
1 3
period prior to the economic crisis in 2008. The median age at first-marriage forma-
tion remained largely the same during 1994–2007. Hence, we find no evidence of 
any demise of marriage, and our findings may align better with the development as 
predicted by gender equality theory, than that of the second demographic transition 
thesis. As a consequence of increased individualism and associated value changes, 
the latter expects age at first-marriage formation to increase and long-term cohabita-
tion to replace marriage—in tandem with sub-replacement fertility and plurality of 
living arrangements (Lasthaeghe 2010, 2014)—of which we find scarce evidence.
Our findings could be seen as an empirical reflection of the previous literature that 
suggests that family values in western countries have not changed as much as the indi-
vidualization perspective predicts: in most countries, marriage is still considered an 
important institution, motherhood is still valued, and a vast majority of women aims 
for two or more children—with little changes observed in preferences over cohorts 
(Esping-Andersen 2016; Scott and Brown 2006). The driving force behind the devel-
opment in Iceland thus appears to be related to structural rather than merely ideologi-
cal factors—i.e. we observe evidence of postponement but nothing that suggests any 
significant quantum changes in family formation over time—which better corresponds 
to the core of arguments as presented by the proponents of gender theory (Goldschei-
der et al. 2015; Esping-Andersen 2016). As societies have progressed towards higher 
levels of gender equality, we might expect recuperation or persistent levels of different 
family-demographic outcomes. However, we do not necessarily expect the postpone-
ment of first-family formation that follows from prolonged education and high female 
labour force participation (Andersson 2000) to regress into earlier patterns.
Our results also suggest that marriage and registered cohabitation are motivated 
somewhat differently in Iceland. Registered cohabitation appears very child related 
as this family formation event appears to centre upon the arrival of children. This 
does not hold for marriage to the same extent. Within a context such as the Icelandic 
one, where the majority of children are born to unwed mothers and cohabitation has 
been semi-regulated, registered cohabitation should perhaps not be seen solely from 
the perspective of union formation. It should also be viewed from the perspective 
that registered cohabitation provides a semi-regulated status for prospective parents 
in relation to childbearing. Marriage on the other hand could be seen as providing an 
elevated union status to long-term couples.
Our findings harmonize with views that most people may want to marry, regard-
less of the diffusion of cohabitation within a country (Perelli-Harris and Sánches 
Gassen 2012). In case of union dissolution or the death of a spouse, married couples 
still have rights that exceed those of registered cohabitants, which may act as an 
incentive for some people to eventually marry.4 With increased age and responsi-
bilities in terms of joint finances, housing (e.g. Holland 2012), and child support, 
it is likely that couples pay more attention to things such as reversionary rights 
and later-in-life security, which could act as a stimulator to get married, and thus 
4 It appears that a part of the population is not aware of the differences between marriage and registered 
cohabitation. In a survey conducted in Iceland in 2011, around 50% of the respondents wrongly believed 
that the same regulations applied to nonmarital cohabitation as to marriage as long as the couple had a 
child together and/or if the union was registered (Friðriksdóttir 2011).
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partially explain why marriage has been as stable over time as our findings indicate. 
To a large extent, marriage may still be viewed as a symbolic declaration (Strandell 
2017), or even a way to show of social status (Cherlin 2004).
Nevertheless, albeit marriage appears as a standard stage in family formation in 
Iceland, it is not a universal institution. According to our estimates a handsome por-
tion of 30% of women had never married at age 45. At the onset of the economic 
crisis in 2008, marriage intensities declined quite sharply, and during 2009–2013 
the propensity to marry was only 70–80% of what it was prior to the crisis. We can 
only offer suggestions as to why the marriage intensities declined as sharply as they 
did. Economic setback and increased unemployment are probable influencers (cf. 
Schaller 2013; Ekert-Jaffe and Solaz 2001), but additionally, the shock and insecu-
rity that accompanied an economic crisis of this magnitude are likely compatriots. 
We can see that the crude marriage rates in other OECD countries declined as well 
during the economic crisis that hit most economies in 2008 (Fig. 1). However, it is 
likely that we will see recuperation in the Icelandic first-marriage rates in the years 
to come. The lower marriage intensities during the aftermath of the economic crisis 
were mainly sustained by lower marriage intensities of younger women at lower par-
ities. Based on our findings from the pre-crisis period, these are groups of women 
who are still likely to marry.
As a concluding remark, our estimates indicate that the high nonmarital birth rate 
in Iceland is mainly a consequence of women having children before marriage, but it 
does not signal any retreat from marriage. Marriage still is a later-in-life event, and 
we find scarce evidence that the intensities to marry decline over time. Also, the vast 
majority of children appear to be born to stable couples but not to single women (see 
Appendix Fig. 5), an important distinction when analysing nonmarital childbearing 
(Thomson 2005). Most children will spend part of their childhood within the realm 
of marriage, but the extent to which this happens with two married biological par-
ents and/or with a parent and step-parent awaits further analyses. In this study, we 
painted the family formation patterns with a broad brush in order to capture the main 
trends and development over time, at the expense of any other underlying trajecto-
ries and detailed sequences of events. The similarities in the developments over time 
of the transitions to first birth and first-registered cohabitation suggest that these two 
events are closely connected. It is plausible that the developments in the latter are 
mainly driven by the trends in Icelandic first-birth fertility. In other words, childless 
couples that presumably already share a residence seem prone to register their union 
around the time of childbirth. Future research, with different data, could investi-
gate the interplay of informal cohabitation, the process of registering the union, and 
becoming a parent—which would provide an all-inclusive picture of Icelandic fam-
ily formation patterns. Comparative analyses with similar countries with regard to 
the prevalence of marriage and premarital cohabitation, such as the other Nordic 
countries, Netherlands, Belgium, and France, would help further our understanding 
of the generalizability of our findings.
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Fig. 5  Kaplan–Meier cumulative probability estimates: First-registered union (registered cohabitation or 
marriage) and first birth 1994–2013, by age of woman over calendar-year periods in Iceland. Source: Ice-
landic register data, author’s calculations
me with the data; the Data Protection Board at Statistics Iceland (Trúnaðargagnanefnd) for approving 
this study (Applications 7/2014 and 12/2015); the associate editor and my two anonymous reviewers for 
their helpful comments and suggestions. This work was supported by the Swedish Research Council (Vet-
enskapsrådet) via the Swedish Initiative for Research on Microdata in the Social and Medical Sciences 
(SIMSAM) under Grant 340-2013-5164 to which I am grateful.
Compliance with Ethical Standards 
Conflict of interest Stockholm University SIMSAM Node for Demographic Research (SUNDEM), 
through SIMSAM, finances the PhD study position the author currently occupies.
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, 
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as 
you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Com-
mons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article 
are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the 
material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is 
not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission 
directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creat iveco mmons .org/licen 
ses/by/4.0/.
Appendix
See Figs. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 and Tables 2 and 3.
85
1 3

















Fig. 6  Cumulative incidence functions: Marriage versus cohabitation in Iceland 1994–2013, by age of 




















































Ages 15 - 26 Ages 29 - 45
Fig. 7  Relative risk of first-registered cohabitation in Iceland 1994–2013. Standardized for age of woman 
and parity, two age groups. Rates are relative to rates in 2003 for each age group (separate models). 



























Fig. 8  Relative risk of first-marriage formation in Iceland 1994–2013, by age. Standardized for parity 
and cohabitation status. Rates are relative to the rates of 25-year olds in 1994–1999. Source: Icelandic 




















































Parities 0 and 1
Parities 2+
Fig. 9  Relative risk of first-marriage formation in Iceland 1994–2013, by parity. Standardized for age 
and cohabitation status. Rates are relative to the rates of women in parity 2+ in 2003. Source: Icelandic 
register data, author’s calculations
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Fig. 10  Relative risk of first-marriage formation in Iceland 1994–2013, by cohabitation status. Stand-
ardized for age and parity. Rates are relative to the rates of women in registered cohabitation in 2003. 




















































Parities 0 and 1
Parities 2+
Fig. 11  Relative risk of first-registered cohabitation in Iceland 1994–2013, by parity. Standardized 
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